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Abstract
The topic of causal explanation in artificial intelligence has gathered interest in recent
years as researchers and practitioners aim to increase trust and understanding of intelli-
gent decision-making and action. While different sub-fields have looked into this problem
with a sub-field-specific view, there are few models that aim to capture explanation in
AI more generally. One general model is based on structural causal models. It defines
an explanation as a fact that, if found to be true, would constitute an actual cause of a
specific event. However, research in philosophy and social sciences shows that explana-
tions are contrastive: that is, when people ask for an explanation of an event – the fact
— they (sometimes implicitly) are asking for an explanation relative to some contrast
case; that is, “Why P rather than Q?”. In this paper, we extend the structural causal
model approach to define two complementary notions of contrastive explanation, and
demonstrate them on two classical AI problems: classification and planning. We believe
that this model can be used to define contrastive explanation of other subfield-specific
AI models.
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1. Introduction
The key insight is to recognise that one does not explain events per se, but
that one explains why the puzzling event occurred in the target cases but not
in some counterfactual contrast case — Hilton [14, p. 67].
The recent explosion in research and application of artificial intelligence has seen a
resurgence of explainable artificial intelligence (XAI) — a body of work that dates back
over three decades; for example, see [3, 4, 29]. This resurgence is driven by lack of trust
from users [27, 18, 20], and also concerns regarding the ethical implications of decisions
made by ‘black box’ algorithms [1].
One key mode of XAI is explanation. An explanation is a justification or reason for
a belief or action. There has been a recent burst of research on explanation in artificial
intelligence, particularly in machine learning. Much of this work has centred around
causal attribution: the process of extracting the causes (or main causes) of a decision or
action; for example, LIME [22] is a system for extracting simplified, local explanations
from black-box classifiers. While causal attribution is an important part of explanation,
people do so much more when explaining complex events to each other, and we can learn
much from considering how people generate, select, present, and evaluate explanations.
Miller [21] systematically surveyed over 250 papers in philosophy, psychology, and
cognitive science on how people explain to each other, and noted perhaps the most
important finding is that explanations are contrastive. That is, people’s do not ask
“Why P?”, but “Why P rather than Q?”, although often Q is implicit in the context.
Following Lipton [19], we will refer to P as the fact and Q as the contrast case.
Researchers in social science argue that contrastive explanation is important for two
reasons. First, people ask contrastive questions when they are surprised by an event and
expected something different. The contrast case identifies what they expected to happen
[14, 31, 19, 5]. This provides a ‘window’ into the questioner’s mental model, identifying
what they do not know [16]. Second, giving contrastive explanations is simpler, more
feasible, and cognitively less demanding to both questioner and explainer [16, 19, 35].
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Lewis argues that a contrastive question “requests information about the features that
differentiate the actual causal history from its counterfactual alternative.” [16, p. 231].
Lipton [19] defines the answer to a contrastive question as the Difference Condition:
To explain why P rather than Q , we must cite a causal difference between
P and not-Q , consisting of a cause of P and the absence of a corresponding
event in the history of not-Q . – Lipton [19, p. 256].
Following this, the explainer does not need to reason about or even know about all
causes of the fact — only those relative to the contrast case.
As an example, consider an algorithm that classifies images of animals. Presented
with an image of a crow, the algorithm correctly identifies this as a crow. When asked
for a reason, a good attribution would highlight features corresponding the crow: its
beak, feathers, wings, feet, and colour — those properties that correspond to the model
of a crow. However, if the question is: “Why did you classify this as a crow instead of
a magpie?”, the questioner already identifies the image as a bird. The attribution that
refers to the beak, feathers, wings, and feet makes a poor explanation, as a magpie also
has these features. Instead, a good explanation would point to what is different, such as
the magpie’s white colouring and larger wingspan.
Importantly, the explanation fits directly within the questioner’s ‘window’ of uncer-
tainty, and is smaller and simpler, even on this trivial example. AI models, though, are
typically more complicated and more structured, implying that contrastive explanation
can provide much benefit. Consider the abstract causal graphs in Figure 1, which are
larger but still trivial by AI standards. The graph on the left is of the factual case,
while the graph on the right is of the contrast case. The dark nodes and thick vertices
are the difference between the two graphs — the light nodes and thin vertices are the
same. It shows that changing the second input explains a difference value for the first
output. A full attribution would explain all 25 causes in both graphs. However, the
difference condition merely needs us to describe those darker regions, which is a simpler
task. Importantly, note that the differences are symmetric: we need only explain one set
of differences, rather than both graphs independently. As Lipton [19] notes, facts and
contrast cases are often closely related, meaning that the difference is often small. For
example, “Why crow rather than magpie?” is more likely than “Why crow rather than
emu?”.
In this paper, we extend Halpern and Pearl’s definition of explanation using structural
causal models [9] to the case of contrastive explanation, providing a general model of
contrastive explanation based on Lipton’s Difference Condition. In particular, we define
contrastive explanation for two types of questions: alternative questions and congruent
questions. An alternative question is of the form “Why P rather than Q?”, and asks why
some fact P occurred instead of some hypothetical foil Q . A congruent question is of
the form “Why P but Q?”, and asks why some fact P occurred in the current situation
while some surrogate Q occurred in some other situation. The difference is that in the
former, the foil is hypothetical, while in the latter, the surrogate is actual and we are
contrasting two events that happened in different situations. From the perspective of
artificial intelligence, the former is asking why a particular algorithm gave an output
rather than some other output that the questioner expected, while the latter is asking
why an algorithm gave a particular output this time but some (probably different) output
another time.
3
(a) Fact (b) Contrast Case
Figure 1: Contrastive Explanation of Casual Graphs Using the Difference Condition.
We define what it means to have a cause of these two contrastive questions, and what
it means to explain them. Although it is not possible to prove such a model is ‘correct’,
we show that the model is internally consistent, and demonstrate it on two representative
examples: classification and goal-directed planning.
2. Related Work
2.1. Philosophical Foundations
In the social sciences, it is generally accepted that explanations are contrastive [21].
The questions that people ask have a contrast case, which is often implicit, and the
explanations that people give explain relative to this contrast case. Even when giving an
explanation with no question, people explain relative to contrast cases.
Garfinkel [6] seems to be the first to make a case for contrastive explanation1. He
provides a story about a well-known bank robber Willie Sutton who purportedly replied
to journalist who asked why he robbed banks, with: “That’s where the money is.”
Garfinkel argues that Sutton answered why he robs [banks/other things], rather than
why he [robs/does not rob] banks because he answered to a different contrast case: that
of banks vs. non-banks, rather than robbing vs. not robbing. Garfinkel notes that these
two different contrasts create two different contexts, and that explanations are relative
to these contrastive contexts. An object of explanation is not just a state of affairs, but
a “state of affairs together with a definite space of alternatives to it” [6, p. 21].
At the same time, Van Fraassen [33] was also arguing the case of contrastive expla-
nations. He states that the underlying structure of a why–question is: “Why (is it the
case that) P in contrast to (other members of) X ?”, in which P is the topic and X is
the contrast class to P [33, p. 127]. An answer to such a question has the structure “P
in contrast to (the rest of) X because A” [33, p. 143]. Van Fraassen argues that when
a questioner asks such a question, they presuppose that: (1) the topic P is true; (2) all
1Although Van Fraassen [33, p. 127] attributes the idea of contrastive explanation to Bengt Hannson
in an unpublished manuscript circulated in 1974.
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other elements of the contrast class X are false; and (3) A is both true and explanatorily
relevant to the topic. He proposes an explicit relation R that determines explanatory
relevance.
Hesslow [12, 13] extends this idea of explanatory relevance and seems to be the first
to make a case for the idea of contrast cases themselves defining explanatory relevance.
He argues that there is a distinction between determining causes and explanatory causes,
with the former being the (often large) set of conditions that contribute to causing an
event, and the latter being a subset of the determining causes that are selected due to
their explanatory power. Hesslow’s theory of explanation is based on two complementary
ideas. The first is that of contrastive explanation. He states that:
. . . the effect or the explanandum; i.e. the event to be explained, should be
construed, not as an object’s having a certain property, but as a difference
between objects with regard to that property. — Hesslow [13, p. 24]
The second is of explanatory relevance. Hesslow argues that by explaining only those
causes that are different between the two or more objects, the explanation is more relevant
to the questioner as it provides those causes that the questioner does not know. In
essence, the contrast case provides a window into the particular causes that the questioner
does not understand.
Hesslow presents an example: “Why did the barn catch on fire?”. The explanation
that someone dropped a lit cigarette in the hay has strong explanatory power and would
satisfy most people. But what about other causes? The presence of oxygen, the hay
being dry, and absence of fire sprinklers are all causes, but the cigarette has particular
explanatory power because oxygen is always present in barns, and most barns are dry
and have no fire sprinklers. The explanation is contrasting to these normal cases.
He formalises this notion as follows. Given an object a, a property E, and a reference
class R (the contrast cases), the cause Ca is an adequate explanation of 〈a,E,R〉 iff:
1. for all x in R, if Cx had been true then Ex would have been true; and
2. if ¬Ca had been true, then ¬Ea would have been true,
in which Cx and Ex refer to the cause C and property E respectively applying to x.
This states that Ca is an adequate explanation if and only iff (1) if the cause C held on
all the other objects x in R (e.g. other barns), then the property E would also hold (the
other barns would have also caught fire); and (2) if the cause C did not apply to a, then
the property E would not hold. We can see that (1) does not apply to oxygen, because
oxygen is present in other barns that do not catch fire, while for the cigarette this is the
case; and that (2) applies to the cigarette — if the cigarette had not been dropped, the
fire would not have occurred.
At a similar time, Lewis [16] proposed a short account of contrastive explanation.
According to Lewis, to explain why P occurred rather than Q , one should offer an event
in the history of P that would not have applied to the history of Q , if Q had occurred.
For example, he states: “Why did I visit Melbourne in 1979, rather than Oxford or
Uppsala or Wellington? Because Monash University invited me. That is part of the
causal history of my visiting Melbourne; and if I had gone to one of the other places
instead, presumably that would not have been part of the causal history of my going
there” Lewis [16, p. 229–230]. This has parallels with Hesslow’s account [12, 13].
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Temple [30] subsequently argued against the case of contrastive explanation. He
argued that the question “Why P rather than Q?” presupposes that P is true and Q
is not, and that the object of explanation is not to explain why P and Q are mutually
exclusive, but instead to ask “Why [P and not Q ]?”. Therefore, contrastive why–
questions are just standard propositional why–questions of the form “Why X ?”, but
with X being [P and not-Q ].
However, Lipton [19] argues that this is a language phenomenon, and semantically,
explaining “Why P rather than Q?” is not the same as explaining “Why [P and not Q
]?”. Building on Lewis’s interpretation based on the history of events [16], Lipton argues
that answering “Why [P and not Q ]?” requires an explanation of P and of not-Q . For
example, to answer why the barn burned down rather than not burning down would
require a complete attribution of why the barn burned down, including the presence of
oxygen, as well as why other barns do not typically burn down. Lipton argues that this
is not what the explainee wants.
Lipton [19] proposes that explanation selection is best described using the Difference
Condition:
To explain why P rather than Q , we must cite a causal difference between
P and not-Q , consisting of a cause of P and the absence of a corresponding
event in the history of not-Q . — Lipton [19, p. 256].
This differs from the definition of contrastive explanation from Lewis [16] in that
instead of selecting a cause of P that is not a cause of Q if Q had occurred, we should
explain the actual difference between P and not-Q ; that is, we should cite a cause that
is in the actual history of P , and an event that did not occur in the actual history of
not-Q .
We can formalise this as the following, in which is the causal relation, and HP and
HnotQ are the history of P and not-Q respectively, and HQ is the hypothetical history of
Q had it occurred:
Lewis c P ∧ c 6 Q where c ∈ HP ∧ c /∈ HQ
Lipton c P ∧ c′  Q where c ∈ HP ∧ c′ /∈ HnotQ
Thus, Lewis’s definition [16] cites some alternative history of facts in which Q oc-
curred, whereas Lipton’s definition [19] refers to the actual history of not-Q . Further,
Lewis’s definition states that the explanation should be an event c (or perhaps set of
events), whereas Lipton’s states that the explanation is the difference between c and c’.
It was generally accepted at the time that Lipton [19] proposed his ideas, that facts
and contrast case are incompatible events [30, 6, 33, 23]; for example, a barn cannot both
burn down and not burn down, or leaves cannot be blue and yellow at the same time.
However, Lipton notes that compatible contrastive cases are also valid. For example, we
can ask why one leaf is blue while another one is yellow. It is perfectly possible that both
leaves could be blue, but we are looking for explanations as to why only one of them is.
Ylikoski [35] provides a more refined model to explain this, noting that incompatible
vs. compatible contrast cases are two different types of question. The first is when
we contrast two incompatible contrasts of the same process; one the fact and one the
‘imagined’ foil. The fact and the foil must be inconsistent. The second is when we
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contrast two facts from two actual and different processes. That is, both facts actually
occurred. Ylikoski calls the second fact a surrogate for a counterfactual claim about the
first process. He claims that the surrogate is used to simplify the explanation — as one
simply needs to find the difference between the fact and stated foil, which is consist with
the idea from Lipton [19] that this is cognitively a simpler problem.
Van Bouwel and Weber [31] divide explanatory questions into four types:
Plain fact : Why does object a have property P?
P-contrast : Why does object a have property P , rather than property Q?
O-contrast : Why does object a have property P , while object b has property Q?
T-contrast : Why does object a have property P at time t, but property Q at time t′?
This defines three types of contrast: within an object (P-contrast), between objects
themselves (O-contrast), and within an object over time (T-contrast). P-contrast is the
standard ‘rather than’ interpretation, while O-contrast and T-contrast correspond to
Ylikoski’s notion of different processes [35].
In Section 4, we will formalise the notion of contrastive questions using the framework
of Halpern and Pearl [8], and will show that the reasoning of Ylikoski [35] is natural with
respective to structural equations and fits the types of questions we would expect in
explainable artificial intelligence. The concept of P-contrast is captured as an alternative
explanations, while O-contrast and T-contrast are captured as congruent explanations.
2.2. Computational Approaches
In artificial intelligence, contrastive questions are not just a matter of academic in-
terest. User studies investigating the types of questions that people have for particular
systems identify “Why not?” questions and contrast classes as important. Lim and Dey
[17] showed that “Why not?” questions are important in context-aware applications,
while Haynes et al. [10] found that users of their virtual aviation pilot system particu-
larly sought information about contrast cases. Given that this is consistent with views
from philosophy and psychology, it makes sense to consider the difference condition as
key to answering these questions.
The idea of contrastive questions in artificial intelligence was around prior to these
studies. The explanation module of the MYCIN expert system explicitly allowed users
to pose questions such as “Why didn’t you do X ?” [3], which is providing a foil for
the fact. More recently, approaches from various sub-disciplines of artificial intelligence
have also defined that contrastive why–questions are important. For example, Winikoff’s
BDI program debugging system supports questions such as “Why don’t you believe . . . ”
and classification tasks that are compared to a contrast case [28], and counterfactual
explanations with natural language [11] to reference just a few. However, few such models
make explicit use of computing the difference between the fact and the contrast case,
with some exceptions; for example, see [24, 32, 26]. Providing two complete explanations
does not take advantage of the difference condition, producing larger and less relevant
explanations.
The aim of this paper is to provide a general computational model of contrastive
explanation that can be mapped to other models in artificial intelligence, such as machine
learning, planning, reinforcement learning, case-based reasoning, BDI agents, etc. As
far as the author is aware, Kean [15] is the only other author to consider a general
computational model of contrastive explanation. Kean’s model of contrastive explanation
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is also built on Lipton’s Difference Condition [19]. Given a knowledge base K and an
observation P , Kean proposes a simple model to calculate why P occurred instead of
Q. Kean provides a definition of a non-preclusive contrastive explanation for “Why P
rather than Q?”, which refers to the propositions that are required for P to hold but not
Q . The definition of a preclusive contrastive explanation uses the Difference Condition,
and, as in this paper, identifies that the contrastive explanation must reference both the
causes of P as well as causes of Q that were not true. There are three key differences
between Kean’s model and the structural approach model approach in this paper. First,
Kean’s model was published when the understanding of causality in artificial intelligence
was in its infancy, and is therefore built on propositional logic, rather than on a logic of
causality and counterfactuals, which is more suitable. Second, Kean’s model considers
only ‘rather than’ questions, and not contrastive explanations with surrogates rather than
foils. Third, Kean’s model is in fact a model of abductive reasoning, in which assumptions
are made about the truth of certain propositions to find the ‘best’ explanation. In
contrast, our model assumes the causal graph is known to the explainer, and the task is
to find a contrastive explanation to an unaware explainee.
3. Structural Models
In this paper, we build definitions of contrastive questions and contrastive explana-
tions based on Halpern and Pearl’s structural models [8]. As opposed to previous models,
which use logical implication or statistic relevance, Halpern and Pearl’s definition is based
on counterfactuals, modelled using structural equations.
In Part I [8] of their paper, Halpern and Pearl provide a formal definition of causality.
A causal model is defined on two sets of variables: exogenous variables, who values are
determined by factors external to the model, and endogenous variables, who values are
determined by relationships with other (exogenous or endogenous) variables.
3.1. Models
Formally, a signature S is a structure (U ,V ,R), in which U is a set of exogenous
variables, V a set of endogenous variables, and R is a function that defines the range of
values for every variable Y ∈ U ∪ V ; that is, the range of a variable Y is R(Y ).
A causal model is a pair, M = (S,F), in which F defines a set of functions, one for
each endogenous variable X ∈ V , such that FX : (×U∈UR(U)) × (×Y ∈V−{X}R(Y )) →
R(X) determines the value of X based on other variables in the model. A causal model
is said to be recursive if it is acyclic.
A context, ~u, is a vector that gives a unique value to each exogenous variable u ∈ U .
A model/context pair (M,~u) is called a situation.
Halpern and Pearl [8] extend this basic structural equation model to support mod-
elling of counterfactuals. To represent counterfactual models, the model M ~X←~x defines
the new causal model given a vector ~X of endogenous variables in V and their values ~x
over the new signature S ~X = (U ,V −
~X,R|V− ~X). This represents the model M with the
values of ~X overridden by ~x. Formally, this model is defined as M ~X←~x = (S ~X ,F
~X←~x),
in which each F
~X←~x
Y in F is defined by setting the values of
~X to ~x in function FY .
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3.2. Language
To reason about these structures, in particular, counterfactuals, Halpern and Pearl
[8] present a simple but powerful language. Given a signature S = (U ,V ,R), variables
X ∈ V and values x ∈ R(X), a formula of the form X = x is called a primitive event, and
describes the event in which variable X is given the value x. A basic causal formula is of
the form [Y1 ← y1, . . . , Yn ← yn]φ, in which φ is any Boolean combination of primitive
events, each Yi is a variable in V (endogenous variable), and yi ∈ R(Yi). We will follow
Halpern and Pearl in abbreviating this formula using [~Y ← ~y]φ, in which ~Y and ~y are
vectors of variables and values respectively. A causal formula is a Boolean combination
of basic causal formulas. If ~Y is empty, this is abbreviated as just φ.
3.3. Semantics
Intuitively, a formula [~Y ← ~y]φ for a situation (M,~u) states that φ would hold in
the model if the counterfactual case of Yi = yi for each Yi ∈ ~Y and yi ∈ ~y were to
occur. More formally, Halpern and Pearl define (M,~u) |= φ to mean that φ holds
in the model and context (M,~u). The |= relation is defined inductively by defining
(M,~u) |= [~Y ← ~y](X = x) as holding if and only if the unique value of X determined
from the model M~Y←~y is x, and defining Boolean combinations in the standard way.
Example 3.1. This section presents a simple example of a hypothetical system that
classifies images of arthropods into several different types, taken from Miller [21]. The
categorisation is based on certain physical features of the arthropods, such as number
of legs, number of eyes, number of wings, etc. Table 1 outlines a simple model of the
features of arthropods for illustrative purposes.
Compound
Type No. Legs Stinger No. Eyes Eyes Wings
Spider 8 ✘ 8 ✘ 0
Beetle 6 ✘ 2 ✔ 2
Bee 6 ✔ 5 ✔ 4
Fly 6 ✘ 5 ✔ 2
Table 1: A simple lay model for distinguishing common arthropods.
The causal model for this has endogenous variables L (number of legs), S (stinger), E
(number of eyes), C (compound eyes),W (number of wings), andO (the output). U1 is an
exogenous variable that determines the actual type of the arthropod, and therefore causes
the values of the properties such as legs, wings, etc. The variables L, E, and W range
over the natural numbers, while S and C are both Boolean. The output O ranges over the
set {Spider,Beetle, Bee, F ly, Unknown}. A causal graph of this is shown in Figure 2a.
The functions are clear from Table 1; for example, FO(8, false, 8, no, 0) = Spider, and
O = Unknown for anything not in the table.
Example 3.2. Consider a extension to the arthropod algorithm in Example 3.1 that
verifies manual annotations on arthropod images. Images are labels with one of Spider,
Beetle, Bee, Fly, or no label (Unknown), and the new algorithm extends the previous
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(a) Causal graph for arthropod algorithm de-
fined in Example 3.1
V
O
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U2
(b) Causal graph for extended arthropod al-
gorithm defined in Example 3.2
one to check whether the manual annotations are correct or not. The same categories
exist, but some images are not labelled at all. To model this, we add a new exogenous
variable U2, which determines the new endogenous variable A – the annotation on the
image. A second endogenous variable V with domain {Pass, Fail} determines whether
the classifier output O corresponds with A. The causal graph is shown in Figure 2b. The
function FV (O,A) = Pass if either A = O or A = Unknown or O = Unknown, to avoid
too many false negatives. Otherwise, FV (O,A) = Fail.
4. Contrastive ‘Why’ Questions
The basic problem of explanation is to answer a why–question. According to Bromberger
[2], a why–question is just a whether–question, preceded by the word ‘why’. A whether–
question is an interrogative question whose correct answer is either ‘yes’ or ‘no’. The
presupposition within a why–question is the fact referred to in the question that is under
explanation, expressed as if it were true (or false if the question is a negative sentence).
For example, the question “why did they do that?” is a why-question, with the in-
ner whether-question being “did they do that?”, and the presupposition being “they did
that”.
However, as discussed already, why–questions are structurally more complicated than
this: they are contrastive. The question then becomes: what is a contrastive why–
question?
In this section, we extend [35]’s argument for the existence of (at least) two dif-
ferent types of contrastive why–questions [35]. In brief, the first asks why some fact
happened rather than some other thing, called the foil, while the second asks why some
fact happened in one situation while another fact, called the surrogate, happened in
another (presumably similar) situation. The first type we call ‘rather than’ or alterna-
tive explananda, because in this case, the foil is an alternative possibility to the fact.
Intuitively, the fact and the foil are incompatible: it is not possible that both of them
could have occurred. This is consistent with Temple’s reading that Q offers an “exclusive
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alternative in the circumstances” [30]. The second type, we call congruent explananda,
because both the fact and the surrogate events actually occurred, but just in different
contexts. The explainee is using the surrogate as a reference point to contrast against
the fact. Using Halpern and Pearl’s structural models [8], we more crisply demonstrate
why there is a difference between these two questions based on the relationships between
the situations in which the fact and its contrast case (foil or surrogate) did and did not
occur respectively.
4.1. Alternative Explananda
Given two events P and Q , Lipton [19] defines a contrastive why–question as:
Why P rather than Q? (1)
For an alternative explananda, this means that, in some situation, the fact P occurred
and the explainee is asking why foil Q did not occur in that situation instead. To semi-
formalise this in structural models: an alternative why–question, given a situation (M,~u),
is:
Why (M,~u) |= φ rather than ψ ? (2)
in which φ is the fact and ψ is the foil. This assumes that φ is actually true in the
situation (M,~u), and that ψ is not. The linguistic reduction to “Why P and not-Q?” is:
Why (M,~u) |= φ ∧ ¬ψ?, (3)
To answer the question in Equation 3, one could argue that an explanation of such
a case is a proof of φ and a counter-example for ψ. However, as argued by Lipton
[19], this is not really what is asked by “Why φ rather than ψ?. The ‘rather than’ is
asking for a relationship between the causes of φ and the causes (or non-causes) of ψ.
As a counterexample to the reductionist argument, Lipton notes that we can answer
a ‘rather than’ question without knowing all causes of the events. For instance, take
the arthropod description from Example 3.1, and a question as to why the algorithm
classified a particular image as a Bee rather than a Fly. Assume that we only know the
value of one variable in the model: W — the number of wings. We cannot give the
cause of O = Bee if we do not know the values of the other variables2. However, we can
still give a perfectively satisfactory answer to the question: it is a Bee rather than a Fly
because it has four wings instead of two. As such, ‘rather than’ questions must be asking
something different to just “Why φ and why ¬ψ?”, for which we need to know all causes
for both φ and ψ.
These alternative explananda make sense as why–questions in artificial intelligence.
Given the arthropod classification example, a ‘rather than’ question represents an ob-
server asking why the output was a particular arthropod rather some other incompatible
foil case; which would presumably often be the answer they were expecting.
An assumption of alternative explananda is that φ and ψ are incompatible. It is clear
that questions such as “Why X ≤ 5 rather than X ≥ 0, where X = 4 and therefore both
2Although in this trivial example, technically we could infer them all, but this is a property of the
particular example, not of ‘rather than’ questions and structural models in general.
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fact and foil are true, do not make sense. However, one could argue that it is possible
to ask ‘rather than’ questions with compatible fact and foils over different variables;
for example “Why X = 4 rather than Y = 5?”. It is not difficult to find a structural
model such that X = 4 and Y = 5. However, the value of Y in the actual situation
must be something other than 5, otherwise the question does not make sense because
it must be that Y = 5 holds. So, the question is really “Why X = 4 ∧ Y = 4 rather
than X = 4 ∧ Y = 5?”, which is incompatible. For this reason, we make the reasonable
assumption that φ and ψ always refer to the same variables and they are incompatible
in the given situation.
4.2. Congruent Explananda
As outlined in Section 2, Ylikoski [35] argues that some contrastive why–questions
can have compatible facts and foils; although he terms a compatible foil as a surrogate.
To be compatible, he argues that they must occur as part of two different ‘processes’.
We model this second type of contrastive question, called a congruent explananda,
by modelling the two different processes as two different situations:
Why (M,~u) |= φ but (M ′, ~u′) |= ψ? (4)
in which the (M,~u) and (M ′, ~u′) are two different situations, including two different
models M and M ′, φ is the fact, and ψ is the surrogate. Note the absence of ‘rather
than’ in the question. Linguistically, this makes sense because both the fact and the
surrogate are actual — there is no hypothetical case.
As a question in explainable AI, this question has a clear interpretation that M
and M ′ refer to two different algorithms and ~u and ~u′ define different ‘inputs’ to the
algorithms. For the arthropod example, a valid question is why the algorithm produced
the output φ for input image J , while some previous execution of the algorithm produced
the different output ψ for different image K. The observer is trying to understand why
the outputs were different, when she expected φ to be ψ like it was in a previous instance.
In the case where M 6= M ′, an example is in which model M ′ is an updated version of
M — for example, new data has been feed into a learning approach to produce a more
refined model —, and the explainee is asking for why the result has changed between the
two models, potentially with ~u = ~u′.
Although not naturally worded as a ‘rather than’ question, it could be argued that
the question is actually a ‘rather than’ question in which the person is asking “Why φ
this time and ψ last time rather than φ (or ψ) both times?”:
Why (M,~u) |= φ and (M ′, ~u′) |= ψ
rather than
(M,~u) |= φ and (M ′, ~u′) |= φ or (M,~u) |= ψ and (M ′, ~u′) |= ψ ?
If we reduce this using the template of “P and not-Q”, and simplify, the result is:
Why (M,~u) |= φ ∧ ¬ψ but (M ′, ~u′) |= ψ ∧ ¬φ ? (5)
This is just the same as the question in Equation 4, however, it assumes that the
fact and surrogate are incompatible. This assumption is too strong, because a perfectly
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valid question is why two different situations are producing the same outcome, despite
the differences in the situation.
In this section, we have demonstrated a case for two types of contrastive why–
question: alternative and congruent explananda. In the remainder of the paper, we
use structural causal models to define what answers to these questions look like, start-
ing with how to define contrastive cause (Section 5) and then contrastive explanation
(Section 6).
5. Contrastive Cause
Before we turn to contrastive explanation, we define contrastive cause. Explanations
typically cite only a subset of the actual causes of an event, and research shows that
various different criteria are used to select these, such as their abnormality, or epistemic
relevance; see Miller [21] for a discussion of these. In Section 6, we build on the definition
of explanation based on epistemic relevance by Halpern and Pearl [9]. However, to do
this, we first need to define what a contrastive cause is.
Informally, a contrastive cause between φ and ψ is a pair, in which the first element is
a cause of φ and the second element is a cause of ψ. Intuitively, a contrastive cause 〈A,B〉
specifies that A is a cause of φ that does not cause ψ, while B is some corresponding
event that causes ψ but does not cause φ. This is consistent with existing philosophical
views; e.g. Ruben [23] defines contrastive explanations as conjunctions between history
of the contrasting events. The particular definition depends whether the why–question
is alternative or congruent.
5.1. Non-contrastive Cause
Our definition of contrastive cause extends Halpern and Pearl’s definition of actual
cause [8]. In their definition, causes are conjunctions of primitive events, represented as
~X = ~x, while the events to be described are Boolean combinations of primitive events.
Halpern and Pearl [8] define two types of cause: sufficient cause and actual cause.
Intuitively, a sufficient cause of an event in a situation is a conjunction of primitive events
such that changing the values of some variables in that conjunct would cause the event
not to occur. An actual cause is simply a minimal sufficient cause; that is, it contains no
unnecessary conjuncts.
More formally, the conjunction of primitive events ~X = ~x is an actual cause of event
φ in a situation (M,~u) if the following three properties hold:
AC1 (M,~u) |= ~X = ~x∧φ — that is, both the event and the cause are true in the actual
situation.
AC2 There is a set ~W ⊆ V and a setting ~x′ of variables ~X such that if (M,~u) |= ~W = ~w
then (M,~u) |= [ ~X ← ~x′, ~W ← ~w]¬φ — that is, if ~X did not have the values ~x and
all variables in W remain the same, then event φ would not have occurred3.
3Note that this is the later definition from Halpern [7], which is simplified compared to the original
definition of Halpern and Pearl [9]. Halpern argues this updated definition is more robust.
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AC3 ~X is minimal; no subset of ~X satisfies AC1 and AC2 – that is, there are no
unnecessary primitive events in the conjunction ~X = ~x.
A sufficient cause is simply the first two items above — that is, a non-minimal actual
cause.
Throughout the rest of this paper, we use the term partial cause to refer to a subset
of conjunctions of an actual cause.
Example 5.1. Consider the arthropod example from Example 3.1. L = 6 (6 legs) is an
actual cause of O = Bee under the situation u3 corresponding to line 3 of Table 1. AC1
holds trivially because L = 6 is in u3 and O = Bee is the output. AC2 holds because
whenever L 6= 6, O = Bee would not hold under u3. AC3 holds because L is just one
variable, so is minimal. Similarly, all other ‘input’ variables are actual causes in u3; e.g.
E = 6.
Example 5.2. For the extended model with annotated images from Example 3.2, con-
sider the situation uu in which there is no annotation (A = Unknown) and we have spider
but with 7 legs (L = 7). If L = 7, then O = Unknown and therefore the verification will
pass (V = Pass), because this does not indicate an inconsistency.
One actual cause for V = Pass is the pair (L = 7, A = Unknown). AC1 holds
trivially. For AC2, we need to change both L and A to also change the value of V to
Fail. If we change L to anything else, V will remain Pass because A = Unknown, and
similarly if we change A. It requires a mismatch in A and O other than Unknown to
produce V = Fail. AC3 holds because the pair of L and O is minimal. Similarly, the
pair (O = Unknown,A = Unknown) is an actual cause. However, the triple (L = 7, A =
Unknown,O = Unknown) is only a sufficient cause, because it is not minimal (violates
AC3): we do not require both L = 7 and O = Unknown.
5.2. Contrastive Causes in Alternative Explananda
To define contrastive cause, we adopt and formalise Lipton’s Difference Condition
[19], which states that we should find causes that are different in the ‘history’ of the
two events. We define the ‘history’ as the situation (M,~u) under which the events are
evaluated; that is, (M,u) for alternative why–questions, and both (M,u) and (M ′, ~u′)
for congruent why–questions.
The particular explanandum for which we want to define cause is no longer a single
event φ, but a pair of events 〈φ, ψ〉, in which φ is the fact and ψ is the foil. Similarly,
causes will consist of two events instead of one, consistent with the difference condition.
Informally, a contrastive alternative cause of a pair of events 〈φ, ψ〉 is a pair of partial
causes, such that the difference between the two causes is the minimum number of changes
required to make ψ become true.
Definition 1 (Contrastive Alternative Cause). A pair of events 〈 ~X = ~x, ~X = ~y〉 is an
contrastive alternative actual cause (also just a alternative cause) of 〈φ, ψ〉 in situation
(M,~u) if and only if the following conditions holds:
CAC1 ~X = ~x is a partial cause of φ under (M,~u).
CAC2 (M,~u′) |= ¬ψ — the foil ψ is not true.
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CAC3 There is a non-empty set ~W ⊆ V and a setting ~w of variables in ~W such that
~X = ~y is a partial cause of ψ under situation (M ~W←~w , ~u).
Informally, this states that there is some hypothetical situation that did not happen,
but is feasible in M ; and that ~X = ~y is a partial cause of ψ under this hypothetical
situation.
CAC4 ( ~X = ~x ∩ ~X = ~y) = ∅ — that is, there are no common events. This is the
difference condition.
CAC5 ~X is maximal — that is, no superset of ~X satisfies CAC1-4.
Similar to the HP definition, we can define sufficient contrastive cause by modifying
CAC1 and CAC3 to refer to partial sufficient causes.
This definition is based on the Halpern [7] definition of actual cause, as conditions
CAC1-3 directly access partial causes, which are subsets of actual causes. However,
the definition is modular with respect to the underlying definition of actual cause, such
that a different definition of actual cause (using structural models), such as the original
definition from Halpern and Pearl [8], could be substituted, and this would change the
semantic interpretation of the above.
The reader may expect to see that CAC2 had an additional statement that no part
of the hypothetical cause of ψ is true, such as
∧
Xi=yi∈ ~X=~y
Xi 6= yi. However, this is
implied by CAC4, because all elements of ~X = ~x are true, and each element of ~X = ~y is
different from its corresponding value in ~X = ~x. Also note that condition CAC3 implies
that the foil ψ is feasible in M . That is, it implies thatM 6|= ¬ψ. For an infeasible event,
there cannot be another situation such ~X = ~y is a cause of ψ, therefore there can be no
difference condition. This seems reasonable though: asking why an infeasible foil did not
occur should not invoke a difference between the fact and foil, but a description that the
foil is infeasible.
Example 5.3. Consider the arthropod example from Example 3.1, asking why an image
was categorised as a Bee instead of a Fly. To answer the alternative why–question, we
take the maximal intersection of two actual causes of Output = Bee and the hypothetical
cause of Output = Fly. In this case, the following pairs correspond to the possible
contrastive causes:
〈S = ✔, S = ✘〉
〈W = 4,W = 2〉.
The image was classified as a Bee instead of a Fly because the image contains a stinger
(S) and four wings (W), while for a Fly, it would have required no stinger and two wings.
The other actual causes of φ and ψ, such as L = 6, are not contrastive causes because
they do not satisfy the difference condition in CAC4.
It is difficult to argue that a particular definition of contrastive cause is correct.
However, we can at least argue that they abide by some commonly-accepted properties;
specifically, the properties of an adequate explanation defined by Hesslow [12] (see Sec-
tion 2.1). This states that, if the alternative causes hold in a different situation, so to
would the alternative events. The following theorem captures this.
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Theorem 1. If C comprises all alternative contrastive actual causes of 〈φ, ψ〉 under
situation (M,~u), then for any maximal-consistent subset4 〈 ~X = ~x, ~X = ~y〉 ⊆ C:
(a) (M,~u) |= [ ~X ← ~y]ψ; and
(b) (M,~u) |= [ ~X ← ~y]¬φ.
We need to consider only the maximal-consistent subsets because the set of all con-
trastive causes could be inconsistent if there are multiple sufficient causes.
Proof. Consider part (a) first. We prove via contradiction. Assume that (M,~u) 6|= [ ~X ←
~y]ψ. From CAC3, ~X = ~y contains partial causes of ψ, so there must be a set of additional
causes ~Z = ~z such that (M,~u) |= [ ~X ← ~y, ~Z ← ~z]ψ. This implies that there is some
(maximal) subset ~Z′ = ~z′ ⊆ ~Z = ~z such that (M,~u) 6|= ~Z′ = ~z′, and is therefore not in
~X = ~x. However, these two implications mean that CAC3 and CAC4 hold for ~Z′ = ~z′.
CAC5 also holds because ~Z′ = ~z′ is maximal. Therefore, ~Z′ = ~z′ is (one half of) a
contrastive cause for 〈φ, ψ〉, and as such, must be part of C. Because ~X = ~y is maximal,
~Z′ = ~z′ must be in ~X = ~y, so it is not possible that both (M,~u) 6|= [ ~X ← ~y]ψ and
(M,~u) |= [ ~X ← ~y, ~Z ← ~z]ψ are true. This contradiction shows that part (a) holds. Part
(b) holds directly because φ and ψ are incompatible.
5.3. Contrastive Causes in Congruent Explananda
For congruent explananda, the definition of ‘history’ is different to that of alternative
explananda, citing two different situations. We define the ‘history’ as the situations
(M,~u) of φ and (M ′, ~u′) of ψ. For the moment, we simplify this by assuming that the
two causal models M and M ′ are the same; e.g. the same algorithm is executed with
different inputs from the environment. We drop this assumption later.
Definition 2 (Contrastive Congruent Cause — Simple Case). A pair of events 〈 ~X =
~x, ~X = ~y〉 is a congruent contrastive actual cause of 〈φ, ψ〉 in their respective situations
(M,~u) and (M,~u′) if:
CCC1 ~X = ~x is a partial cause of φ under (M,~u).
CCC2 ~X = ~y is a partial cause of ψ under (M,~u′).
CCC3 ( ~X = ~x) ∩ ( ~X = ~y) = ∅ — that is, there are no common events. This is the
difference condition.
CCC4 ~X is maximal — that is, no superset of ~X satisfies CCC1-3.
Note that CCC1 implies (M,~u) |= ~X = ~x ∧ φ (AC1) and similarly for CCC2.
A sufficient contrastive cause can be obtained by modifying CCC1 and CCC2 to refer
to partial sufficient causes.
This definition is simpler than that of alternative explanation (compare CAC3 with
CCC2), because both the fact and surrogate are actual events, whereas in alternative
explananda, the foil is hypothetical.
4We abuse notation slightly here: ~X = ~x is the conjunction of the first items of all of the subset;
similarly ~X = ~y is the conjunction of the second items.
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Example 5.4. Consider again the arthropod example from Example 3.1, and the con-
trastive why–question for two images B and F , in which B was categorised as a Bee and
F a fly. The situations for these two cases are straightforward to extract from Table 1,
as are the causes. To answer the contrastive why–question, we take the maximal inter-
section actual causes of Output = Bee and Output = Fly under models (M,~uB) and
(M,~uF ) respectively, which is simply the same as in Example 5.3:
〈S = ✔, S = ✘〉
〈W = 4,W = 2〉.
Note that the difference condition is the same as is in the alternative case, however, in
this case, there was no need to find a hypothetical situation for the foil.
Theorem 2. If C comprises all alternative contrastive actual causes of 〈φ, ψ〉 under
respective situations (M,~u) and (M,~u′) then for any maximal-consistent subset 〈 ~X =
~x, ~X = ~y〉 ⊆ C:
(a) (M,~u) |= [ ~X ← ~y]ψ; and
(b) (M,~u′) |= [ ~X ← ~x]φ.
Proof. The proofs for both parts are similar to the proof for alternative causes in Theo-
rem 1, except that we refer to CCC2-4 instead of CAC3-5.
Now we return to the case in which the two models may be different. For this,
we define a restricted cause of φ under situation (M,~u), where M = (S,F), as a pair
(F ′, ~X = ~x′), in which ~X = ~x′ is a sufficient cause of φ, and F ′ ⊆ F is the smallest
subset of F required to derive φ. That is, for all ~u′, (M,~u′) |= φ iff (MF
′
, ~u′) |= φ, where
MF
′
= (S,F ′), and therefore all functions F \ F ′ do not influence φ in any situation. A
partial restricted cause is simply (Fφ, ~X = ~x) such that Fφ ⊆ F ′ and ~X = ~x ⊆ ~X = ~x′.
Definition 3 (Contrastive Congruent Cause— General Case). A pair 〈(Fφ, ~X = ~x), (Fψ , ~Y =
~y)〉 is a congruent contrastive actual cause of 〈φ, ψ〉 in their respective situations (M,~u)
and (M ′, ~u′) if and only if the following conditions hold:
CCC1 (Fφ, ~X = ~x) is a partial restricted cause of φ under situation (M,~u).
CCC2 (Fψ , ~Y = ~y) is a partial restricted cause of ψ under situation (M ′, ~u′).
CCC3 Fφ ∩ Fψ = ∅ and ( ~X = ~x) ∩ (~Y = ~y) = ∅ — that is, there are no common
functions or pairs of events. This is the difference condition.
CCC4 (Fφ, ~X = ~x, Fψ, ~Y = ~y, ~X ∩ ~Y) is maximal.
That is, there is no tuple (Fφ
′
, ~X′ = ~x′, Fψ
′
, ~Y′ = ~y′, ~X ′ ∩ ~Y ′) 6= (Fφ, ~X =
~x, Fψ, ~Y = ~y, ~X ∩ ~Y) satisfying CCC1, CCC2, and CCC4 such that Fφ ⊆ Fφ
′
,
Fψ ⊆ Fψ
′
, ~X = ~x ⊆ ~X′ = ~x′, ~Y = ~y ⊆ ~Y′ = ~y′, and ~X ∩ ~Y ⊆ ~X ′ ∩ ~Y ′.
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Note two differences between this and the less general version. First, the definition
refers to differences in the functions of the two models. Second, the sets of variables that
are referred to are no longer shared between the two models. That is, in the less general
definition, the contrastive cause 〈 ~X = ~x, ~X = ~y〉 both pointed to ~X. However, the sets
of variables can be different between the two models M and M ′, so it is possible that
some variable in ~Y does not exist in model M , but is a cause of ψ in (M ′, ~u′). Note that
CCC4 also states that ~X ∩ ~Y is maximal, meaning that the two parts of a contrastive
cause can only cite different variables if at least one of the models does not contain that
variable.
In the case where M = M ′, this definition is the same as Definition 2 because Fφ =
Fψ = ∅ and ~X = ~Y.
Example 5.5. Consider now the combination of Examples 3.1 (the simple arthropod
classification example) and 3.2 (the extended example in which images may come an-
notated). Let M be the model without the extension and M ′ be the extended model.
Asking why (M,~u) |= O = Unknown and (M ′, ~u′) |= O = Bee, in which ~u and ~u′ both
correspond to features of a Bee but L = 5 (five legs) and A = Bee in ~u′, a contrastive
cause would be:
〈(FO = f, ∅), (FO = f ′, A = Bee)〉,
in which f and f ′ refer to the before and after functions for FO inM andM
′ respectively,
and are hopefully clear from the description. Here, the contrast cites the change in
functions and the additional cause A = Bee as the difference condition.
Example 5.6. The more general definition is also useful for reasoning about situations
in which the fact and surrogate are the same event. That is, “Why (M,~u) |= φ but
(M ′, ~u′) |= φ”? This is useful for situations in which an observer wants to understand
why the event φ still occurs despite the model changing. As an example, consider the
two simple structural models in Figure 3, with exogenous variables U1 and U2, and
endogenous variables P , Q, R, and S. S depends on all four variables in M , but there is
no variable Q in model M ′.
For the contrast between (M,~u) |= S = 0 and (M ′, ~u′) |= S = 0, in which ~u leads to
P = 1, Q = 0, R = 1, and S = 0 and ~u′ leads to P = 1, R = 1, S = 0, the contrastive
cause would be cited as:
〈(FR = max(P,Q), ∅), (FR = P, ∅)〉.
That is, the difference is in the function FR, not in any of the variables nor the output.
To explore some properties of this, we introduce notation that allows us to reason
about changes in models at a meta level. Recall that a structural model M = (S,F)
consists of a set of signatures S and a set of functions F . We define the override of a set
of functions F by another set F ′, denoted F ⇐ F ′ being the same as F , except replacing
FX with F
′
X for all variables X such that F
′
X ∈ F . The notation M ⇐ F
′ represents the
overriding of the functions in M with F ′.
Theorem 3. If C comprises all alternative contrastive actual causes of 〈φ, ψ〉 under re-
spective situations (M,~u) and (M,~u′) then for any maximal-consistent subset 〈(Fφ, ~X =
~x), (Fψ, ~Y = ~y)〉 ⊆ C, the following hold:
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Figure 3: Structural Models for for Example 5.6
(a) (M ⇐ Fψ, s) |= [~Y ← ~y]ψ
(b) (M ′ ⇐ Fφ, s) |= [ ~X ← ~x]φ.
Proof. The proof for this is an extension of the proof for Theorem 2. The only case that
requires attention is when variables are added/removed to/from the model. In this case,
the model M ⇐ Fψ may contain the function FX , which is in M but not M ′. However,
if the variable X is not in M ′, then ψ cannot refer to it, so its is effectively redundant in
M ⇐ Fψ.
5.4. Presuppositions
As noted previously, it is difficult to argue that a particular definition of contrastive
cause is correct, but we can show our definition behaves according to some commonly-
accepted properties. In this section, we show that our definition is consistent with the
the idea of contrastive explanation as presupposed explanation [19].
Lipton [19] notes that to give an explanation for “Why P rather than Q?” is to give
a to “give a certain type of explanation of P , given P or Q , and an explanation that
succeeds with the presupposition will not generally succeed without it.” [19, p. 251]
(emphasis original). Thus, this states that if we assume that P and Q are the only two
possible outcomes, and are mutually exclusive, then the actual cause of P under this
assumption will refer to exactly those variables in the difference condition.
Formally, the assumption is M |= φ ⊕ ψ — that is, under all models of M , either
φ is true or ψ is true, and not both. Note the absence of a situation ~u. Thus, we can
re-phrase an alternative explanandum as:
Assuming M |= (φ ⊕ ψ), why (M,~u) |= φ ? (6)
As a shorthand, we use Mφ⊕ψ to refer to the sub-model of M in which φ⊕ ψ is always
true. That is, the functions in F are restricted such that assignments to all variables
always conform to φ⊕ ψ.
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The set of events ~X = ~x is a presupposed contrastive cause of φ under situation (M,~u)
and assumption M |= φ⊕ ψ if and only if the following condition holds:
PAC ~X = ~x is an actual cause of φ under the situation (Mφ⊕ψ, ~u).
That is, if we assume that φ ⊕ ψ always holds in a structural model, then an actual
cause of φ in that model under situation ~u is sufficient to identify the different condition.
Note here that the cause is not contrastive because it is not a pair – it just refers to
the variables in ~X and their values in ~u. However, this is enough for us to propose the
following theorem.
Theorem 4. ~X = ~x is an actual cause of φ under situation (M,~u) assuming M |= φ⊕ψ
if and only if 〈 ~X = ~x, ~X = ~y〉 is an alternative contrastive cause of 〈φ, ψ〉 under situation
(M,~u) for some ~y.
Proof. This theorem is effectively stating that if AC1-3 hold assuming φ⊕ψ, then CAC1-5
hold for some ~y, and vice-versa.
The left-to-right case: For CAC1, if ~X = ~x is an actual cause under a restricted model
Mφ⊕ψ, then model M must admit ~X = ~x as (at least) a partial cause for φ. For CAC2,
(M,~u) |= ¬ψ must hold because φ holds according to AC1, and φ and ψ are mutually
exclusive. For the remainder, we need to show that a ~y exists such that CAC3-5 hold.
From AC2, we know that there exists some counterfactual situation in which φ would
not have occurred under Mφ⊕ψ. In such a situation, it must be that ψ occurred, so all
such situations would be candidate values for ~y. This implies CAC3. In addition, the
values in ~y must make ψ true, and therefore must be different from the values in ~x, so
CAC4 holds. Finally, we prove CAC5 (maximality) by contradiction. Assume that ~X is
not maximal. This implies there exists some additional variables ~Y not in ~X that must
change to make ψ hold under (M,~u). However, this would also require these variables
to change under Mφ⊕ψ, which would mean that ~X = ~x is not a complete actual cause
of φ, contradicting the definition of PAC. Therefore, ~X must be maximal.
For the right-to-left case, AC1 is implied trivially by CAC1: ~X = ~x and φ hold under
Mφ⊕ψ, and expanding the model without changing the structural equations themselves
will not change the φ. AC2 is implied by CAC3: if there is an alternative situation ~u′
underM such that ψ holds, then that same situation must exist inMφ⊕ψ becauseMφ⊕ψ
does not exclude situations in which ψ holds, so any such situation gives us the setting
for ~x′ that is required for the counterfactual situation in AC2.
For AC3, we need to show that the partial cause ~X = ~x under M is minimal under
Mφ⊕ψ. We prove this by contradiction. Assume that ~X = ~x is not minimal under
Mφ⊕ψ. This means that there is some variable W that has no effect on φ under Mφ⊕ψ,
but is cited as a contrastive cause. Therefore, some part of the contrastive cause cites
the events ( ~W = ~w, ~W = ~z) for some ~w, ~z, and that ~W = ~w is a partial cause of φ under
(M,~u) and ~W = ~z is a partial cause of ψ under the hypothetical situation in CAC3.
However, ~W = ~z must then be a counterfactual case for ~W that satisfies AC2 under
Mφ⊕ψ, meaning that it affects φ. This is a contradiction for our assumption that ~X = ~x
is not minimal.
Theorem 5. ~X = ~x is an actual cause of φ under situation (M,~u) assuming M |= φ⊕ψ
and ~X = ~y is an actual cause of ψ under situation (M ′, ~u′) assuming M |= φ ⊕ ψ if
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and only if 〈 ~X = ~x, ~X = ~y〉 is an congruent contrastive cause of 〈φ, ψ〉 under situations
(M,~u) and (M ′, ~u).
Proof. The proof is a straightforward extension of the proof from Theorem 4. In brief:
the ~y referred to in Theorem 4 is from the surrogate. The two cases on the left of the if
and only if are symmetric, so the proof above extends to this.
6. Constrastive Explanation
Now that we have defined contrastive cause, we can define contrastive explanation.
This is a simple extension to the existing definition of Halpern and Pearl [8]’s definition,
but using contrastive causes instead of standard actual causes.
6.1. Non-Contrastive Explanation
In Part II [9] of their paper, Halpern and Pearl build on the definition of causation
from Part I to provide a definition of causal explanation. They define the difference
between causality and explanation as such: causality is the problem of determining which
events cause another, whereas explanation is the problem of providing the necessary
information in order to establish causation. Thus, an explanation is a fact that, if found
to be true, would be a cause for an explanandum, but is initially unknown. As such,
they consider that explanation should be relative to an epistemic state. This is in fact a
definition of contrastive explanation using epistemic relevance [25].
Informally, an explanation is defined in their framework as follows. Consider an agent
with an epistemic state K, who seeks an explanation of event φ. A good explanation
should: (a) provide more information than is contained in K; (b) update K in such a
way that the person can now understand the cause of φ; and (c) it may be a requirement
that φ is true or probable5.
Halpern and Pearl [9] formalise this by definingK as a set of contexts, which represents
the set of ‘possible worlds’ that the questioning agent considers possible. Therefore, an
agent believes φ if and only if (M,~u) |= φ holds for every ~u in its epistemic state K. A
complete explanation effectively eliminates possible worlds of the explainee so that they
can now determine the cause. Formally, an event ~X = ~x is an explanation of event φ
relative to a set of contexts K if the following hold:
EX1 (M,~u) |= φ for each ~u ∈ K — that is, the agent believes that φ.
EX2 ~X = ~x is a sufficient cause of φ for all situations (M,~u) where u ∈ K such that
(M,~u) |= ~X = ~x.
EX3 ~X is minimal — no subset of ~X satisfies EX2.
EX4 (M,~u) |= ¬( ~X = ~x) for some ~u ∈ K and (M,~u′) |= ~X = ~x for some (other) ~u′ ∈ K
— that is, before the explanation, the agent is initially uncertain whether the
information contained in the explanation is true or not, meaning the explanation
meaningfully provides information.
5In the case of an explainer and explainee, we may say that it is ‘believed’ by the explainer.
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Example 6.1. Consider the basic arthropod example (Example 3.1), in which O =
Unknown due to a spider with only 7 legs. The agent knows that the image has 8 eyes
and no stinger, but is uncertain of the remaining variables. The explanation for why
O = Unknown is just L = 7 (7 legs). This is a sufficient cause for O = Unknown, is
minimal, and the agent does not know it previously.
For the extended arthropod example, consider the same case, but with V = Pass
(known to the agent) and A = Unknown (unknown to the agent). An explanation for
why V = Pass would cite the pair (O = Unknown,A = Unknown). The agent would
need to know both parts of information to determine the cause. Another explanation
would be (L = 7, A = Unknown), as knowing L = 7 allows the agent to determine
O = Unknown. If the agent already knows O = Unknown, then the explanation is a
singleton again; either L = 7 or O = Unknown will suffice.
6.2. Contrastive Alternative Explanation
We extend the above definition to contrastive alternative causes. As with the Halpern
and Pearl definition, it is defined relative to an epistemic state and model, however, as
it describes a contrastive cause, the explanation is a pair.
Definition 4 (Contrastive Alternative Explanation). Given a structural model M , a
pair of events 〈 ~X = ~x, ~X = ~y〉 is a contrastive alternative explanation of 〈φ, ψ〉 relative
to K if and only if the following hold:
AEX1 (M,~u) |= φ ∧ ¬ψ for each ~u ∈ K — that is, the agent accepts that φ and that
¬ψ.
AEX2 〈 ~X = ~x, ~X = ~y〉 is a sufficient alternative cause for 〈φ, ψ〉, for each ~u ∈ K such
that (M,~u) |= ~X = ~x.
AEX3 ~X is minimal — no subset of ~X satisfies AEX2.
AEX4 (M,~u) |= ¬( ~X = ~x) for some ~u ∈ K and (M,~u′) |= ~X = ~x for some (other)
~u′ ∈ K; and for some ~W = ~w such that ~w 6= ~x, (M ~W←~w , ~u) |=
~X = ~y for some
~u ∈ K and (M ~W←~w , ~u
′) |= ¬( ~X = ~y) for some (other) ~u′ ∈ K – that is, agent is
initially uncertain whether the explanation is true or not, meaning the explanation
provides meaningful information.
Example 6.2. Consider the same two cases from Example 6.1. An explanation for why
O = Unknown rather than O = Spider would cite the pair 〈L = 7, L = 8〉: the image
has 7 legs but requires 8 to be a spider. We can already see that this is more informative
than the non-contrastive cause, because we are given the counterfactual case of what
should have been to make O = Spider.
For the extended case, an explanation for why V = Pass rather than V = Fail
(the only possible foil) is the pair of tuples 〈(O = Unknown,A = Unknown), (O =
X,A = X)〉, where X is one of Spider, Beetle, etc., or the pair of tuple 〈(L = 7, A =
Unknown), (L = 8, A = Spider)〉, and similarly for other types. Again, if the agent
already knows A or L, then pairs of singletons suffice.
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Definition 4 defines an alternative contrastive explanation as finding part of an al-
ternative cause that satisfies the conditions AEX1-4. However, we can think of this in
different way: finding partial explanations for each of φ and ψ and taking the difference
between these, where we define a partial explanation as just a subset of an explanation.
Definition 5 (Contrastive Alternative Explanation – Alternative Definition). Given
a structural model M , a pair of events 〈 ~X = ~x, ~X = ~y〉 is a contrastive alternative
explanation of 〈φ, ψ〉 relative to K if and only if the following hold:
AEX1′ ~X = ~x is a partial explanation of φ in (M,~u).
AEX2′ There is a non-empty set ~W ⊆ V and a setting ~w of variables in ~W such that
~X = ~y is a partial explanation of ψ under situation (M ~W←~w , ~u).
AEX3′ ( ~X = ~x) ∩ ( ~X = ~y) = ∅ — the difference condition.
AEX4′ ~X is maximal — that is, there is no superset of ~X that satisfies AEX1′-3′.
Theorem 6. AEX1-4 iff AEX1-4′ — that is, the two definitions of contrastive alterna-
tive explanation are equivalent.
Proof. Left-to-right case: (AEX1′) This holds from AEX2-4. If 〈 ~X = ~x, ~X = ~y〉 is a
sufficient alternative cause for 〈φ, ψ〉 that is minimal and uncertain, then ~X = ~x must be
a partial explanation of φ under (M,~u); that is, the agent believes φ, some superset of
~X = ~x is an actual cause of φ, and the agent is uncertain about some of that superset.
(AEX2′) The same argument holds, except that ~X = ~y is true under the hypothetical
situation (M ~W←~w , ~u) from AEX2; and therefore, this hypothetical situation is a witness
for AEX2′. (AEX3′) The difference condition holds because this is a requirement of
AEX2. (AEX4′) holds from the maximality condition in AEX2. This establishes the
left-to-right case.
Right-to-left case: (AEX1) This holds directly from AEX1′, because the acceptance of
φ in K is a condition of an explanation under the original Halpern and Pearl definition,
and ψ must be false whenever φ is true. (AEX2) If ~X = ~x and ~X = ~y are partial
explanations of φ under (M,~u) and ψ under (M ~W←~w , ~u) respectively, then they must
be partial causes too. If their intersection is empty and ~X is maximal, then this defines
a sufficient cause, so AEX2 holds. (AEX3) We prove this via contradiction. Assume
~X is not minimal. This implies that there is some strict superset ~Y ⊃ ~X that satisfies
AEX1′-4′ and AEX2. However, if this were the case, then AEX4′ would not hold: ~X
would not be maximal over AEX1′-3′, which is a contradiction, so our assumption is
false. (AEX4) If ~X = ~x and ~X = ~y are partial explanations under (M,~u) and some
hypothetical counterfactual case (M ~W←~w , ~u), then the agent must be uncertain about
~X = ~x in (M,~u) and ~X = ~y in (M ~W←~w , ~u). This establishes the right-to-left case, and
the theorem holds.
6.3. Congruent Contrastive Explanation
For the congruent case, an explanation is similar, however, it refers to two epistemic
states, K and K′, in which K models the uncertainty of the individual in the situation
(M,~u) and K′ models the uncertainty in (M ′, ~u′).
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Definition 6 (Contrastive Congruent Explanation – Simple Case). Given a structural
model M , a pair 〈 ~X = ~x, ~X = ~y〉 is a contrastive congruent explanation of 〈φ, ψ〉 relative
to two epistemic states K and K′ if and only if the following hold:
CEX1 (M,~u) |= φ for each ~u ∈ K and (M ′, ~u′) |= ψ for each ~u′ ∈ K′ — that is, the
agent accepts that φ under (M,~u) and that ¬ψ under (M ′, ~u′).
CEX2 for each ~u ∈ K such that (M,~u) |= ~X = ~x and ~u′ ∈ K′ such that (M ′, ~u′) |=
~X = ~y, 〈 ~X = ~x, ~X = ~y〉 is an sufficient congruent cause for 〈φ, ψ〉 under (M,~u) and
(M ′, ~u′).
CEX3 ~X is minimal — that is, no superset of ~X satisfies CEX2.
CEX4 (M,~u) |= ¬( ~X = ~x) for some ~u ∈ K and (M,~u′) |= ~X = ~x for some (other)
~u′ ∈ K; and (M,~u) |= ~X = ~y for some ~u ∈ K′ and (M,~u′) |= ¬( ~X = ~y) for some
(other) ~u′ ∈ K′ – that is, the agent is initially uncertain whether the explanation
is true or not, meaning the explanation provides meaningful information.
This is similar to the definition of AEX, except that the rules refer to an actual
situation ~u′, rather than the hypothetical situation implied by AEX2. The more general
case in which there are differences between the models is straightforward projection of
this.
Example 6.3. Consider the case of the 7-legged spider (situation ~u7), and a second
case of a ‘proper’ spider (~u8). The agent is uncertain of all variables and asks why
O = Unknown under (M,~u7) and O = Spider under (M,~u8). The explanation is as
before: 〈L = 7, L = 8〉. Note here that the agent already knows that L = 8, because it
knows that O = Spider, so can determine the values of the input variables. However, we
still cite this in the explanation because it contrasts L = 7. The extended case is similar
to the alternative explanation.
Definition 6 defines congruent explanation as finding part of an alternative cause
that satisfies the conditions CEX1-4. However, we can think of congruent explanation in
different way: finding partial explanations for each of φ and ψ and taking the difference
between these, where we define partial explanation as just subsets of explanations.
Definition 7 (Contrastive Congruent Explanation – Simple Case, Alternative Defini-
tion). Given a structural model M , a pair of events 〈 ~X = ~x, ~X = ~y〉 is a contrastive
congruent explanation of 〈φ, ψ〉 relative to two epistemic states K and K′ if and only if
the following hold:
CEX1′ ~X = ~x is a partial explanation of φ in (M,~u).
CEX2′ ~X = ~y is a partial explanation of ψ in (M,~u′).
CEX3′ ( ~X = ~x) ∩ ( ~X = ~y) = ∅ — the difference condition.
CEX4′ ~X is maximal — that is, there is no superset of ~X that satisfies CEX1′-3′.
Theorem 7. CEX1-4 iff CEX1′-4′ — that is, the two definitions of contrastive congruent
explanation are equivalent.
Proof. The proof for this is similar to the proof for Theorem 6, except simpler because
we deal only with factual situations and no hypothetical situations.
24
6.4. Non-Contrastive General Explanation
The definitions provided in the previous section merely allow explanations in which
the causal model is known to the explainee agent, but the agent is uncertain which
context is the real context. A more general definition allows for explanations in which
the agent is also uncertain about the causal model, and thus the explanation is about
both the causal model and the context.
Halpern and Pearl [9] present an extended definition of explanation based on this
idea. In this case, an epistemic state K is now a set of situations (M,~u) instead of a set
of just contexts. A general explanation is of the form (α, ~X = ~x), in which α is a causal
formula. The first component restricts the set of models, while the second restricts the
set of contexts.
A formula-event pair (α, ~X = ~x) is an explanation of event φ relative to a set of
situations K if:
EX1 (M,~u) |= φ for each (M,~u) ∈ K (unchanged).
EX2 for all situations (M,~u) such that (M,~u) |= ~X = ~x and M |= α (α is valid in all
contexts consistent with M), ~X = ~x is a sufficient cause of φ.
EX3 (α, ~X = ~x) is minimal — there is no pair (α′, ~X′ = ~x′) 6= (α, ~X = ~x) satisfying
EX2 such that {M ′′ ∈ M(K) | M ′′ |= α′} ⊇ {M ′′ ∈ M(K) | M ′′ |= α} and
~X′ = ~x′ ⊆ ~X = ~x, where M(K) = {M | (M,~u) ∈ K for some ~u}.
EX4 (M,~u) |= ¬( ~X = ~x) for some (M,~u) ∈ K and (M ′, ~u) |= ~X = ~x for some (other)
(M ′, ~u′) ∈ K — that is, the agent is uncertain, as before.
In this definition, the two parts of the explanation play different roles. The formula
α characterises the part of the model that is unknown to the agent to just enough
information to understand the causes of φ; while φ is an explanation in that restricted
set of models.
Example 6.4. As a simple example, consider an agent who does not know how the
arthropod system works at all, and confronted with O = Spider, they ask why. An
explanation is the pair:
(L = 8 ∧ S = 4 ∧ E = 8 ∧ C = 4 ∧W = 0⇒ O = Spider, L = 8)
plus one for all other variables other than L. The formula informs the explainee what
the properties of a spider are, but does not need to define the entire model nor even the
properties of other arthropods.
However, the α part of the explanation can be arbitrary causal formula. For example,
given a 7-legged spider with no annotation, which will cause V = Pass, an explanation
could refer to formula such as:
(O = Unknown ∧ A = Unknown)⇒ [A← Spider](V = Pass),
which means that when both variables are unknown, adding an annotation will still give
a result of Pass.
25
6.5. General Contrastive Explanation
The more general case of contrastive explanation is straightforward to project from
this definition. We give just the definition for congruent explanation.
Definition 8. General Contrastive Congruent Explanation Given a structural modelM ,
a pair of formula-event pairs 〈(α, ~X = ~x), (β, ~X = ~y)〉 is a general contrastive congruent
explanation of 〈φ, ψ〉 relative to two epistemic states K and K′ if and only if the following
hold:
CEX1 (M,~u) |= φ for each (M,~u) ∈ K and (M ′, ~u′) |= ψ for each (M,~u′) ∈ K′.
CEX2 for all situations (M,~u) such that (M,~u) |= ~X = ~x andM |= α and all situations
(M ′, ~u′) such that (M ′, ~u′) |= ~X = ~y and M ′ |= β, 〈 ~X = ~x, ~X = ~y〉 is a sufficient
congruent cause of 〈φ, ψ〉.
CEX3 (α, ~X = ~x, β, ~X = ~y) is minimal — there is no tuple (α′, ~X′ = ~x′, β′, ~X′ =
~y′) 6= (α, ~X = ~x, β, ~X = ~y) satisfying CEX2 such that {M ′′ ∈M(K) |M ′′ |= α′} ⊇
{M ′′ ∈M(K) |M ′′ |= α}, similarly for β, ~X′ = ~x′ ⊆ ~X = ~x, and ~X′ = ~y′ ⊆ ~X = ~y.
CEX4 (M,~u) |= ¬( ~X = ~x) for some (M,~u) ∈ K and (M ′, ~u′) |= ~X = ~x for some (other)
(M ′, ~u′) ∈ K; and (M,~u) |= ~X = ~y for some (M,~u) ∈ K′ and (M,~u′) |= ¬( ~X = ~y)
for some (other) (M,~u′) ∈ K′ – that is, the agent is initially uncertain whether the
explanation is true or not.
The general alternative explanation case is straightforward to extend from Defini-
tion 8, however, one important point of difference is that the explanation is not a pair,
but a triple, 〈α, ~X = ~y, ~X = ~y). There is no requirement for the second formula β
because there is only one model to characterise.
Example 6.5. Consider the extended arthropod system in the situation in Example 6.1,
where there is an image of a spider with 7 legs. In this case, the verification passes because
O = Unknown. The agent knows all variables but is unaware of FV , so does not know
the verification procedure, and asks “Why V = Pass instead of V = Fail?”
In this case, the explanation is a formula expressing the semantics of FV , and no
variables:
〈(O = Unknown ∨ A = Unknown⇒ V = Pass), L = 7, L = 8〉
6.6. Example: Goal-Directed AI Planning
Throughout the paper, we have used the two examples of the arthropod system to
illustrate ideas. In this section, we consider a different type of AI system: goal-directed
planning.
Example 6.6. Consider an abstract example of a goal-directed planning system that
needs to choose which actions A1, A2, and A3 to apply. Using a simple action language,
we define these actions, their preconditions, and their effects as:
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Action Pre Effect
A1 P1 → G1 ∧G3
A2 P2 → G2 ∧G3
A3 true → P2
in which A[1−3] are names of the actions, G[1−3] are propositions modelling goals, and
P[1−2] are propositions modelling action preconditions. The planner can apply none, one,
or many actions.
Figure 4 shows the causal graph for this, in which U[1−5] are exogenous variables.
Variables are Boolean. The structured equations are such that action A1 is selected if
G1 or G3 is the goal, and its precondition P1 holds; A2 is selected if G2 or G3 is the
goal, and its precondition P2 holds; and A3 is selected if precondition P2 needs to be
made true. Note that this does not model the cause of the preconditions goals becoming
true/false, but the cause of action selection, which makes the graph appear somewhat
inverted. The parent node for each action has both the variables it requires to be true to
execute the action as well as the variables the action will change; e.g. A1 will be ‘fired’
if P1 is true and G1 is true, which counter-intuitively models that in the actual planning
problem, the goal is currently false and should become true. We could also add a node
which states whether the goal is true/false and only execute the action if the goal is false,
but we omit this for simplicity. Note that P2 is the parent of A3, modelling that this is
A3’s intermediate ‘goal’ – it makes P2 true, thus enabling A2 to be selected next.
A1 A2
P1 P2
G1 G3
G2
U1
U2 U3
U4
U5
A3
Figure 4: Causal graph for goal-directed planning
Now consider the case in which G1 and G3 are the goals (while G2 is false) and P1 and
P2 are both true, implying that A1 is true and A2 is false. A contrastive question could
be: “Why A1 rather than A2?”, which would be modelled as “Why (M,~u) |= A1 ∧ A2
rather than ¬A1 ∧ A2?”. K (the epistemic state of the explainee) is such that G1 is
known to be true, but the agent is unsure of the other goals and the preconditions.
The alternative contrastive cause for this is the pair 〈(G1,¬G1), (¬G2, G2)〉. That is,
for the A2 to be true instead of A1 (CAC3), it would require that the goals G1 and G2
are swapped. CAC1-2 hold trivially, and CAC4 (the difference conditions) holds because
there are no common events. CAC5 (maximality) holds because changing the values of
G1 or the preconditions P1 and P2 do not satisfy the difference condition CAC4.
The contrastive explanation, however, consists only of 〈(¬G2, G2)〉 – the agent already
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knows that G1 is true so including G1 would not satisfy both AEX3 (the minimality
condition) and AEX4 (the ‘meaningful’ condition).
Example 6.7. Consider a congruent setting with two situations ~u1 and ~u2. In both
situations, G3 is the only goal. In ~u1, precondition P1 is true while P2 is false, and vice-
versa for ~u2. The explainee agent knows only that action A1 was selected under ~u1 and
A2 was selected under ~u2. The congruent explanation for this is 〈(P1,¬P2), (¬P1, P2)〉.
The goals are not included even though the agent does not know their values, because
they are the same between the two situations, so do not satisfy the difference condition.
Example 6.8. Finally, consider the example of A3 being selected in order to make P2
true and allow A2 to be selected in the next time step. The goal is G2 and the explainee
knows the values of all goal variables and action variables, does not know the values of
the preconditions, and asks why A3 rather than A2 .
The effect of AEX4 is that this has no explanation! Intuitively, one may expect that
(¬P2, P2) to be offered, however for this to be an explanation, AEX4 requires that there
is some situation ~u ∈ K in which P2 could be true. But this is not possible because the
agent knows that A2 is false and G2 is true, which cannot be the case if P2 is true, so no
such situation exists. According to the model M , there can be only situation in K where
the goals are all known as ¬G1, G2, and ¬G3, and in that situation ¬P1 and P2 hold.
This offers the agent a complete explanation already. This makes sense: the agent does
not require an explanation because it can infer the values of P1 and P2 itself.
However, consider the case of a general contrastive explanation in which the agent’s
knowledge is missing part of the structure of the causal graph; specifically, that P2 is
the precondition of A2, meaning that the edge P2 → A2 is missing from the graph
in Figure 4. Now we have an explanation! In this case, the explanation is 〈(FA2 =
f, ∅), (FA2 = f
′,¬P2)〉, in which f is the definition of FA2 without the precondition, and
f ′ includes the precondition.
7. Conclusion
Using structural causal models, Halpern and Pearl [9] define explanation as a fact that,
if found to be true, would constitute an actual cause of a specific event. In this paper,
we extend this definition of explanation to consider contrastive explanations. Founded
on existing research in philosophy and cognitive science, we define two types of con-
trastive why-questions: alternative why–questions (‘rather than’) and and congruent
why–questions (‘but’). We define ‘contrastive cause’ for these two questions and from
this, build a model of contrastive explanation. We show that this model is consistent
with well-accepted properties of contrastive explanation, and with alternative definitions.
The aim of this work is to provide a general model of contrastive explanation. While
there are many examples of researchers considering alternative contrastive questions in
explainable artificial intelligence, few consider congruent questions. Even fewer exploit
the power of the difference condition, instead providing two full explanations: one of the
fact and one of the foil. In essence, they consider contrastive questions but not contrastive
explanations. The difference condition is what brings power and relevance to contrastive
explanations, and as such, giving two complete explanations does not correctly answer
the question. We hope that this article serves as a basis for researchers in explainable
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artificial intelligence to adopt the idea of the difference condition and ultimately give
better explanations to people.
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